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Sed ut ad loquendum de dialectica revertamur, vide
multis placuisse illam positionem qua positum est, ni-
hil crescere.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the various testimonia assembled by Iwakuma and Ebbesen to the
twelfth-century school of philosophers known as the Nominales,2 four record
their commitment to the apparently outrageous thesis that nothing grows.
My aim in this essay is to explore the reasons the Nominales had for main-
taining this thesis and to investigate the role that the theory which sup-
ported it played in the development of late twelfth- and early
thirteenth-century debates over the character of the hypostatic union. My
investigation concerns only one aspect of twelfth-century Nominalism3 but
once this part of their system is understood, we will be better able to
characterise the whole and the way in which the views of the Nominales
conflicted with those of their opponents. So long as the testimonia remain
few and rather slight such a reconstruction offers our only hope for finding
the Nominales and their influence where their name has not been recorded.
The Nominales were in some sense the followers of Peter Abaelard and
in Abaelard’s work we find discussions of the thesis that nothing grows. I
will thus begin with an account of Abaelard’s theory of integral wholes, the
1. Alexander Neckham, De Naturis Rerum Et De Laudibus Divinae Sapientiae, ed.
T. H. Wright (London, 1863), chap. 174, p. 288.
2. Iwakuma Yukio and Sten Ebbesen, “Logico -Theological Schools from the
Second Half of the 12th Century: A List of Sources,” Vivarium XXX (1992):173–210.
3. Since this group were apparently the first ever to be called ‘nominalists’ I
think that we may justifiably capitalize the name of the theory to indicate that we
are referring to their version of it.
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kinds of entities of which he thinks the thesis is true. In the testimonia the
claim that nothing grows is connected with another which has it that the
reference of masculine and feminine pronouns differs from that of neuter
pronouns. Abaelard is important in linking the two theses but the theoreti-
cal connection can best be made, I argue, by appealing to a treatment of
obligationes that must surely be associated with the Nominales. Finally, having
established the character of the thesis that nothing grows and its theoretical
connection with the thesis of the variety of pronomial reference I will begin
to explore the role played by the theory that supports both theses in
accounts of the hypostatic union dating from the end of the twelfth and the
beginning of the thirteenth century.
II. ABAELARD ON THE IDENTITY
OF INTEGRAL WHOLES
Abaelard investigates the character of growth, or augmentation, and de-
crease as kinds of change, and specifically as kinds of quantitative change,
both in his treatment of intrinsic loci in the Dialectica4 and of Aristotle’s
classification of changes in the Logica ‘Ingredientibus.’5 In both works he
raises the question of what it is that is properly to be said to undergo such
changes and points out that if the putative object of change is described
simply as an integral whole, then it seems that nothing grows.
To characterise increase and decrease Abaelard proposes that such
changes occur to something when there is an addition to or subtraction
from its quantity.6 Since the cases of increase and decrease are entirely
parallel I will from now on talk only about growth, or augmentation.
In general, then, according to Abaelard, growth occurs with the addi-
tion of parts to an integral whole. Thus, in order for a substance or any
other item to grow it must constitute such a whole. This is uncontroversially
so in the case of corporeal substances which are, as bodies, continuous
integral wholes. Collections of disconnected items may also be integral
4. Petrus Abaelardus, Dialectica, ed. L. M. De Rijk, 2nd ed. (Assen: Van Gorcum
1970), III:1, p. 418 ff.
5. Logica ‘Ingredientibus’, in Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften, Beiträge
zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, ed. B. Geyer, XXI, (Münster: Aschendorff
1919–1933), p. 299 ff. Abaelard discusses Aristotle’s classification of changes in the
Categories. He also knows from Boethius of the different classification given in the
Physics.
6. Dialectica, p. 421: “Et est quidem augmentum motus essentiae rei secundum
quantitatis ipsius intensionem, diminutio uero secundum eiusdem remissionem.
Mutatur enim res secundum augmentum, cum ipsa substantiae quantitas per addi-
tamentum alicuius creuit, ueluti cum pueris adolentibus sua Deus occulte ministrat
incrementa atque nostram extendit qualibet dimensione substantiam siue in altum
siue in longum seu in latum.”
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wholes and the question of just which collections do constitute such wholes
is a crucial one for the theory.
The problem that interests us arises with the attempt to locate exactly
what it is that grows with the addition of parts. Identifying an integral whole
simply by its having the parts that it does, Abaelard uses an argument
familiar from criticisms of the theory of universals as classes to show that
such a whole cannot grow. In order for an item to grow it must be possible
for it, the very same item, to be larger, in the sense of having more parts, at
some later time than it had at an earlier time. The addition of new parts to
an integral whole results, on the other hand, in an entirely new whole.7
It seems that an augmentation cannot come about in something by the
addition of something, indeed it seems that nothing is augmented. For
when something is added to something what is added does not grow,
nor does that to which it is added grow, since it has no more parts than
it had before. Nor does the whole formed by conjoining them seem to
grow. For it has just the same parts as it had before, the part that was
added and the part to which it was added.
The parallel passage in the Logica ‘Ingredientibus’ formulates the appar-
ently paradoxical claim almost exactly as we find it attributed to the Nomi-
nales. “It seems,” says Abaelard there, that “no things grow,” “there is, it seems,
nothing that becomes greater than it was before by the addition of some-
thing.”8 The conclusion follows immediately and obviously from the indi-
viduation and differentiation of an integral whole solely by its parts. In the
Dialetica on the other hand Abaelard is prepared to allow that some talk of
growth is nevertheless appropriate for such wholes. He argues, in effect, that
we may say that one such integral whole is greater than another in virtue of
7. Dialetica, p. 421: “Non enim aliquod augmentum fieri in aliquo uidetur per
adiunctionem alicuius, quippe nihil augeri uidetur. Neque enim cum aliquid alicui
apponitur, illud quod appositum est, creuit neque illud cui appositum est, cum
plures partes quam prius non habeat. Sed nec totum quod ex eis coniunctum est,
creuisse uidetur. Eas enim tantum partes adhuc retinet quas prius habebat, illud
scilicet quod est adiunctum et cui est adiunctum.”
8. Logica ‘Ingredientibus’, p. 299: “Si quis autem crescere dicat adiunctione
alicuius maius effici, quam prius esset, nulla crescere uidentur. Nihil est quod uideatur
maius fieri, quam prius erat ex additamento, ut si tribus lapidibus quartus addatur
atque ideo aceruus qui prius erat trium lapidum, creuisse dicatur adiunctione
quarti lapidis, non uidetur uerum, cum uidelicet aceruus trium lapidum adiuncto
etiam quarto lapide in quantitate sui non plus quam habeat, sed tribus lapidibus
tunc quoque constat, sicut ante, nec plures partes quam prius habet, sed nec
quartus lapis superadditus simili ratione creuit nec ipsum quoque compositum ex
tribus lapidibus et quarto adiuncto.”
The example of the pile of stones is a very obvious one but it interesting find
it attributed to the Nominales, probably at least a hundred years after Abaelard
wrote, in an anoymous note recorded as item 70 by Iwakuma and Ebbesen:
“Praeterea dicunt Nominales quod nihil crescit, unde si lapis acervo lapidum
adiciatur, non erit idem acervus <at> que prius, sed alius—quare autem hoc sit,
bene cogitata—reales autem econtra.”
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augmentation if at the time in question it includes the other as a proper part
but at an earlier time the part existed without being included in the collec-
tion that now constitutes the greater whole.9 Thus in the case of a gnomon
adjoined to a square, we may say that the resulting larger square is aug-
mented with respect to both the smaller square and the gnomon.
Abaelard rejects as contrary to both ordinary usage and authority the
only alternative theory of growth that he considers here. According to this
theory, if a part P is added to a whole W, then the whole W + P grows if the
part P is moved closer to the whole W. Growth is simply the rearrangement
of parts. This rejected theory seems to attempt to address an objection to
Abaelard’s criterion of growth that he does not raise directly: How are we
to locate earlier and later wholes when all the putative parts exist during the
time period under consideration?
Although he does not raise the question, Abaelard does provide an
answer to it. For he notes that, since “no thing has at any time more or fewer
parts than at any other” it seems that only continuous wholes can be said to
have come to be by augmentation.10 The distinction between the earlier
and the later whole must be made in terms of the connection to one
another, or lack of it, of the parts. It is simply not legitimate, according to
the theory of the Dialectica, to talk of growth where the wholes in question
consist of discrete parts.
Despite saving the concept of growth in some sense, Abaelard does not
come close in this part of the Dialectica to giving us what we want: an account,
that is, of growth which will allow the truth of perfectly ordinary claims such
as ‘Socrates grew from a child into a man.’ Curiously, while in two other places
in the Dialectica11 he appeals to a solution to the problem which guarantees
9. Dialectica, p. 422: “Cum autem omnia cuiuslibet partis membra ipsum quo-
que constituant totum, necesse est totum a singulis partibus suis in quantitate
partium abundare, id est easdem omnes et insuper quasdam habere, quod quidem
est plures in augmento partes habere.”
Dialectica, p. 423: “Non enim, sicut diximus, aliqua pars in constitutione cui-
uslibet augetur, sed ipsum compositum respectu componentium creuit, cum
uidelicet totum contineat quod unaquaeque pars comprehendit atque insuper
quicquid quaelibet aliarum partium continent.”
Dialectica, p. 423: “Unde cum dicimus: si quid cuilibet rei sit additum totum
maius efficitur, non ita est accipiendum ut maius fiat compositum quam prius esset,
sed maius quam singulae partes effectum est per adiunctionem cuiuslibet ipsarum;
prius namque compositum non erat. Et si aliae partes quae prius erant, accipiantur,
non erit numerus earum diminutus; eaedem enim extra coniunctionem erant
partes quae intra. Fit itaque augmenti comparatio non de composito ad se ipsum,
sed de toto ad singulas partes.”
10. Dialectica, pp. 423–24: “Ac fortasse in his rebus quae coniunctionem non
exigunt, sed naturaliter discretae sunt, sicut numeri, nihil operatur ad augmentum
compositio, sed in his quae per continuationem fiunt, ut in quadrangulo qui ex
gnomone et quadrangulo coniungitur.”
11. In the discussion of the quantitative comparison of accidents, Dialectica, p.
426 ff. and in the discussion of integral wholes, Dialectica, p. 547 ff.
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the legitimacy of such claims, the solution itself, is not set out in that work but
rather in the Logica ‘Ingredientibus.’ 12 It is interesting to note in passing, how-
ever, that in the Dialectica, Abaelard points out that one consequence of an ac-
count of principal parts that he rejects is that a substance is individuated
precisely by its having the integral parts that it does. It follows, he argues, that,
according to this theory, whenever Socrates cuts his toenails or fingernails he
destroys his substance. In fact, the cutting of each successive nail destroys a
different substance and so the name ‘Socrates’ is radically equivocal, its refer-
ence varies from one moment to the next.13
12. The discussion in the Logica ‘Ingredientibus’ covers many of the same ques-
tions as that in the Dialectica and in particular the important distinction between
first and second creation. It is not obvious, however, at least to me that one of the
discussions marks a particular advance upon the other.
13. In the discussion of increase and decrease with respect to the comparison
of accidental features, Abaelard sets out the conditions for something to be said to
be more or less white than it was before. Here the substance which supports the
accidents is what unifies the quanitative whole constituted by the collection of
individual whitenesses. To say that Socrates is whiter today than he was yesterday is
equivalent to saying that Socrates’s whiteness has increased between yesterday and
today. The quantitative whole which yesterday consisted of all the individual white-
nesses inhering in Socrates has not grown. It is impossible for it to do so. Rather,
Socrates’s whiteness has grown by the addition of individual whitenesses. It now
consists of a collection of individual whitenesses of which yesterday’s collection of
individual whitenesses is a proper part.
Dialectica, p. 427: “Augmentum itaque per aggregationem, sicut detrimentum
per substractionem, contingit, ut nihil proprie augmentatum dicatur nisi respectu
eius quod prius de ipso fuerat, eius uidelicet partis quae prius sola exstiterat, ueluti,
cum illi quae prius fuerat albedini alia aggregatur, albedo crescere dicitur secun-
dum aggregatam partem et hoc subiectum quod ipsam suscipit, magis album quam
prius secundum albedinis augmentum dicitur.”
One of the criteria proposed for being a principal part of an integral whole
which Abaelard investigates has it that a part is a principal part if and only if upon
its destruction there follows the destruction of the substance of the whole. Abaelard
notes that the criterion requires the destruction of substance rather than quantity
since any subtraction from a quantitative whole destroys its quantity. Although
Socrates’s quantity is destroyed when he cuts his nails, nevertheless the ‘Socratic
substance’ survives the operation.
Dialectica, p. 549: “Substantiae uero destructionem ideo considerant: ad quanti-
tatis totius diminutionem cuiuslibet partis destructio sufficit, ut si hic etiam unguis
pereat, quantitas Socratis corporis eadem remanere non potest, cum tanta iam non
sit quanta prius erat. Sicut enim per adiunctionem cuiuslibet totum crescit, sic per
eius substrationem diminuitur. Cum autem ungue adempto quantitas corporis ea-
dem non remaneat, Socraticae tamen essentia substantiae non uidetur mutata; ad-
huc enim et homo et Socrates dicitur. Sed non omnia illa quae prius erant, secundum
quantitatem esse contingit, id est unguem cum caeteris omnibus partibus.”
Abaelard goes on to conclude as a reductio of this destructive criterion of
principal parts that it follows that every part is in fact a principal part and so upon
the subtraction of even the smallest part substantial destruction follows. He notes
that the theory in effect identifies the substance simply as the collection of its
integral parts, and makes ‘Socrates’ and ‘this man’ equivocal from one moment to
the next.
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Godfrey of Poitiers, writing in the second decade of the thirteenth
century reports of the Nominales that “when they say that nothing grows,
they say that each body ceases to be in each instant.”14
In the Logica ‘Ingredientibus’ Abaelard offers a simple and obvious solu-
tion to the puzzle that if growth is by addition then nothing grows.15 The
solution turns upon the possibility of characterizing integral wholes at
different levels of generality. It is true, of course, that the addition of a
fourth stone to a heap of three stones does not make the heap of three
stones into a heap of four stones, nothing can do that, since it is impossible
for three to be four. On the other hand, the addition of the fourth stone
certainly results in a larger heap. Thus, without any mention of the solution
set out in the Dialectica, Abaelard notes that the problem:
may easily be solved, if, that is, we say that that grows which by the
addition of something other becomes a composite that does not cease
to have its nature or property, just as for example if some water is added
to water, it becomes a composite which is also called water.16
For the Nominales, the case of water will turn out to be rather less straight-
forward than Abaelard supposes but it is clear that the solution will work for
cases such as Socrates’s growth from child to man. Despite the many addi-
tions to his flesh, he remains throughout a human being and Socrates.
Abaelard discusses various difficulties with the application of this solution to
collections of substances of different kinds but quickly points out that it can
always be implemented by taking a general term, say X, which applies to all
the items in the resulting collection and noting an increase, or growth, in the
Dialectica, p. 552: “Sed quid dicemus, si ex cuiuslibet partis destructione totius
substantiae, sequitur interitus, cum ungue perdito aut tota etiam manu uel pede
Socratem remanere uiderimus et in ipso adhuc hominis integram substantiam
permanere? Non itaque hic homo in omnibus suis partibus simul consistere
uidetur, sed in his tantum praeter quas reperiri non potest; alioquin aequiuoca eius
praedicatio per diuersa tempora uidebitur secundum augmenta corporis sui uel
detrimenta. Si enim omnium simul quae in homine modo sunt, ‘Socrates’ aut ‘hic
homo’ nomina fiunt, cum dicitur hoc corpus hic homo esse, omnia quae in eo sunt
praedicabuntur. Si uero ungue adempto uel pede absciso ‘hic homo’ de residuo
corpore enuntietur, non eadem praedicatio fuerit substantia iam diminuta nec
huius hominis substantia quae prius erat ea quae modo est poterit dici, id est haec
manus cum reliquo corpore reliquum corpus esse.”
Abaelard goes on to argue that amputating a hand—and indeed merely cutting
off a nail—would be murder since it would cause the destruction of the substance.
14. Iwakuma and Ebbesen, text 48c: “Licet tamen concederem ‘Socrates est
aliud quam  fuerit’ secundum opinionem  Nominalium  (qui,  cum  dicunt  nihil
crescere, dicunt quod quodlibet corpus in quolibet instanti desinit esse), secundum
eos non ideo concederem ‘Christus est aliud quam ipse sit’.”
15. Logica ‘Ingredientibus’, p. 299.
16. Logica ‘Ingredientibus’, p. 299: “Sic autem fortasse facilius soluetur, si uidelicet
crescere id dicamus quod per adiunctionem alterius transit in tale compositum quod
a natura uel proprietate sua non recedit, ueluti si aquae alia aqua superaddatur, aqua
cui superadditum est, in quoddam transit compositum quod etiam aqua dicitur.”
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number of Xs. He does not, unfortunately, discuss whether there are any limits
on the choice of terms.
Abaelard’s solution to the puzzle of identity through growth and dimi-
nution recalls that which was apparently proposed by Chrysippus. Like
Chrysippus, indeed, he uses the example of the consequences of the amputa-
tion of a foot in arguing for the absurdity of a theory which individuates a sub-
stance solely through its integral parts. There seems to be no way, however,
that Abaelard and his contemporaries could have known of the work of their
Stoic predecessors on the Growing Argument. They reinvented the problems
of ancient logic and in Abaelard’s case rediscovered one of the solutions.
Alexander Neckham was, by his own admission, a Parvipontanian Real-
ist,17 an opponent of the Nominales and one of our main sources of evidence
for their views. In his theological treatise, the Speculum Speculationum, he re-
fers to the Nominales in discussing the question of whether the term ‘person’
is univocally predicated of God and creatures and implies at least that there
was some connection for them between claims about growth and the use of
different forms of pronouns:
It is customary to ask in logical investigations whether to be Peter is to be
someone (esse quem) and whether to be Peter is to be something (esse
quid). This accepted, infer ‘therefore to be someone is to be something.’
There are many, and especially the Nominales, who judge in entirely the
same way about the supposition of a created person and a divine person.
They say therefore that to be Peter is to be someone but not to be
something. Whence they say that to the question ‘who is running’ (‘quis
currit’) one should reply ‘Peter’ but to the question ‘What is running’
(‘quid currit’) one should reply ‘a substance’. Just as they assert ‘Peter
grows’ but not, however, ‘a substance grows’. But isn’t the growth (cre-
mentum) which is in Peter in a substance? Isn’t man a species of the genus
substance? Isn’t being Peter inferior to being a substance?18
17. In De Laudibus Divinae Sapientiae talking about Paris he says, (ll. 330–36):
“Qua Modici Pontis parva columna fui. / Hic artes didici docuique fideliter, inde /
Accesit studio lectio sacra meo.” In de Naturis Rerum, p. 288, he expresses himself
amazed at those who reject the claim that ‘ex impossible per se quodcumque sequi
enuntiabile’. So he was trained in the school of the Adamitae. Godfrey of St. Victor
in his Fons Philiosophiae classifies the Parvipontini as Reales (Iwakuma and Ebbesen,
text 18); Jaques of Vitry, in his Exempla (Iwakuma and Ebbesen, text 53), tells a story
in which the Adamitae, are identified with the Reales.
18. Alexander Nequam, Speculum Speculationum, ed. R. M. Thompson (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 123–24; Iwakuma and Ebbesen, text 40b: “Solet
autem in logicis queri utrum esse Petrum sit esse quem, et utrum esse Petrum sit
esse quid. Quibus datis, infer ergo “Esse quem est esse quid” uel econtrario. Multi
sunt et presertim Nominales, qui eodem modo prorsus iudicant de suppositione
persone create, quo et de suppositione persone diuine. Dicunt ergo quod esse
Petrum est esse quem et non esse quid. Vnde et, ad hanc, ‘Quis currit?’, dicunt
respondendum ‘Petrus’. Ad hanc autem, ‘Quid currit?’, dicunt respondendum
‘Substantia’. Vt enim aiunt, ‘Petrus crescit’, non tamen ‘Substantia crescit’. Sed
nonne crementum quod est in Petro est in substantia? Nonne homo species est
huius generis ‘substantia’? Nonne esse Petrum est inferius ad esse substantiam?”
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Twice in Abaelard’s works we find a distinction made between inter-
rogatives formed with ‘quid ’ and those formed with ‘quis,’ or, according to
the Logica ‘Ingredientibus,’ ‘quae’ or ‘quod ’.19 On both occasions he tells us
that ‘quid est’ has to do with natures and requires that a name indicating a
general or specific status be given in response. The answer, that is, to such
questions takes the form ‘est X ’ where X is a genus or species of substance
or of one of the accidental categories, the status in question is being X (esse
X). ‘Quis’20 on the other hand requires a proper name, the name of a
person, to be given in response. Unfortunately Abaelard does not expand
on these requirements. An explanation of the connection between the form
taken by answers to pronomial questions and the thesis that nothing grows
can, however, be reconstructed from the discussion of positio impossibilis in
the Tractatus Emmeranus.21
III. IMPOSSIBLE UNIONS AND THE NOMINALIST
THEORY OF PREDICATION
Although their names are nowhere mentioned in it, the Tractatus Emmer-
anus is one of the most important texts for the reconstruction of the views
of the Nominales. More than that, since it is at least in part a manual of
instruction and what it instructs us in is an aspect of their logical theory, the
later we date it the later we must date the survival of the Nominales as an
active school with their own logic. I have discussed the Nominalist character
of the treatise elsewhere.22 Briefly, it is revealed beyond any doubt in the
specification of Abaelard’s connexive logic as the appropriate logic for
reasoning under impossible hypotheses and in the recognition that it fol-
lows from this specification that an appeal to the locus “from opposites” is
unacceptable there.
As one kind of impossible hypothesis the author of the Tractatus allows
us to posit unions which are physically but not conceptually impossible. He
strikingly supports his claim that we can understand unions such as those
which unite in one way or another Socrates the man with Brownie the
donkey by appealing to our ability to understand the physically impossible,
but supernaturally actualised, hypostatic union.
19. Logica ‘Ingredientibus’ pp. 35–36: “praedicari [in] eo quod quid sit, id est
reddi conuenienter ad interrogationem factam per ‘quid’, non per ‘quis’ uel ‘quae’
uel ‘quod’, quae magis propria nomina requirunt . . .; Logica ‘Nostrorum Petitioni
Sociorum’, ed. Geyer, p. 537: “Et harum aliae sunt naturales, id est per quas natura
petitur demonstrari, ut: quid est homo, aliae personales, ut illae, per quas quaeritur
persona distingui a caeteris, ut: quis est in domo? Socrates.”
20. And, according to the Logica ‘Ingredientibus’, ‘quae’ and ‘quod est’!
21. Published in (L. M. de Rijk,) “Some Thirteenth Century Tracts on the
Game of Obligation,” Vivarium XII (1974): 94–123.
22. “The Logic of the Nominales, or the Rise and Fall of impossible positio,”
Vivarium XXX (1992): 123 ff.
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No reason is given in the Tractatus for hypothesising impossible unions
but the general reason for positing the impossibile is that by doing so we will
be forced to reflect on the logical relations between the items involved. I have
argued elsewhere that such “thought experiments” were crucial in the devel-
opment of accounts of the Trinity.23 We will see shortly that they also played
an important role in Christology at the end of the twelfth century.
The Tractatus considers unions of both things and enuntiabilia. The
latter were certainly of great interest to the Nominales, but here I want only
to consider impossible unions of things. The interesting cases are unions of
rational beings since for such beings, following Boethius, we may make a
distinction between the nature and the person. Socrates is a person since
he is an individual substance with a rational nature. His nature is that in
virtue of which he is a human being. In the Incarnation the second person
of the Trinity in some way came to be human while remaining divine.
The question of the relation of the divine and the human in Christ was
the subject of intense debate in the second half of the twelfth century, and
until Alexander III’s condemnation of the Habitus Theory in 1177 there were
three competing accounts. The second of them in Peter Lombard’s order-
ing,24 the Subsistence Theory, holds that two distinct natures, one divine and
the other human were united in the single person of Jesus Christ. This theory
seems to correspond to Abaelard’s views and, though he himself apparently
had little to say on the subject, it was attributed to him by John of Cornwall.25
In the Trinity on the other hand we have three persons united in a single
nature. Thus, we have reason to reflect on two kinds of unions of persons and
nature. The Tractatus does not quite offer the rules for conducting such a
study, but rather gives those to be used in exploring the various unions of
persons and what it calls ‘essences’ [essentiae].
Three kinds of union are available, of persons only, of essences only,
and of both persons and essences. To characterise them the Tractatus offers
a rule for distinguishing the essential from the personal.
Note that essential terms are said to be those which are predicated in
the same way of a whole as they are of each of its parts; for example
‘body’, ‘wood’ and the like. Personal terms are said to be those which
are predicated of a whole in such a way that they are not predicated of
a part of it, as for example the term ‘man’ and the term ‘animal’.26
23. In “Impossible Positio as the Foundation of Metaphysics,” in Semiotics and
Logic in Mediaeval Logic Texts, ed. Costantino Marmo, (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997) pp.
255-76.
24. Petrus Lombardus, Libri IV Sententiarum, III:6.
25. “The Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papam tertium, of John of Cornwall,” ed. N.
M. Haring, Mediaeval Studies 13 (1951): 253–300, see pp. 263–65. John also tries very
unconvincingly to foist the Habitus Theory on Abaelard.
26. “The Game of Obligation,” p. 120: “Et notandum quod termini essentiales
dicuntur illi qui predicantur ita de toto quod de qualibet eius parte; ut ‘corpus’,
‘lignum’ et similia. Termini personales dicuntur illi qui ita predicantur de toto quod
non de qualibet eius parte; ut iste terminus ‘homo’ est et iste terminus ‘animal’.”
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The distinction is apparently intended to be that between homogenous
and non-homogenous materials and this is confirmed by ‘flesh’ being given
later as another example of an essential term. In order for ‘body’ to charac-
terise something homogeneous in this way, however, it will be necessary to
construe it as mass-noun rather than as a count-noun. That is, each of the cor-
poreal parts of Socrates is, as is Socrates himself, a body but we should not ask
how many bodies there are in this room but rather how much body.
Given this distinction we may consider the three types of union, and,
in particular, the inferences that will hold in virtue of them. The inclusion
of ‘body’ in the list of essential terms means that any union of two corporeal
substances may be a union of their essences only, of their persons only, or
of both. Each of these is characterised according to the Tractatus by a rule
of predication. In an essential union any essential term predicated truly of
one of the components as it exists outside the union is predicated essentially
of both of them when they are united essentially and likewise for personal
terms in a personal union. In particular, the Tractatus notes, claims about
identity have to be assessed in terms of the kind of union proposed. If
Socrates and Plato are united only in a union of essences, then ‘Socrates est
idem quod Plato’ will have to be conceded but not ‘Socrates est Plato’. The
converse holds of a union of their persons alone.
This contrast between predicative expressions of the form ‘X est Y ’ and
those of the form ‘X est idem quod Y ’ is exactly that made by Abaelard
between predications of property and predications of substance in his discussion
of the Trinity.27 The difference between such predications is, he argues, that
in the first, X is asserted to have any property expressed by Y, and in
particular any relational property, whereas in the second, X is said to be the
thing which has the properties expressed by Y. The distinction is absolutely
crucial in its application to the Trinity since, because persons involve
relational properties, ‘X est Y ’ is true only if ‘X ’ and ‘Y ’ are names for the
same person whereas the truth of ‘X est idem quod Y ’ is guaranteed for any
two distinct persons by their having the same essence, the divine nature. In
explaining the distinction between these two kinds of predications Abaelard
draws an analogy with the distinction between the wax of a waxen image,
and the waxen image itself, between the matter and the enmattered. In this
case because of the relational character of the terms ‘matter and ‘enmat-
tered’ both possible predications of property are false while the correspond-
ing predications of substance are true.
While the Tractatus does not deal with interrogation directly, it does
note that under such impossible hypotheses by union, inferences from
claims formulated using neuter adjectives  to  those  using masculine or
feminine adjectives are unacceptable. The reason for this we are told is that:
Masculine and feminine are imposed from the form of the thing and
for this reason are called formal terms, and so personal; the neuter
27. Theologia Christiana, IV:86–92.
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gender is not imposed from any form which is in the thing but rather
from pure privation. And so the thing is understood without form, and
so the term is essential.28
The talk here of pure privation and the contrast with form as the
justification for calling terms essential recalls the contrast repeatedly in-
sisted on by Abaelard between the differentiating forms and the material
essence of a thing. If that is the distinction that is intended then the
pronoun ‘quid’ would, as Abaelard proposed, pick out a substance in its
generic or substantial status. The talk of pure privation here is modified a
little later by the observation that fleshness and corporeity are forms of
essences alone. Essence for the Tractatus thus is not “bare” matter but rather
the uniform stuffs which Aristotle called homœmeries.
What has perhaps happened is that Abaelard’s material essence has
been understood as homogenous matter—through not as a prime mat-
ter—and as that which is picked out as such by neuter pronuns and adjec-
tives. Non-homogeneous things on the other hand are so in virtue of forms
determining structure and function and are picked out as such with ‘per-
sonal’ adjectives and pronouns with masculine and feminine endings.
In the Dialectica Abaelard argued that integral wholes cannot grow. In
the Logica ‘Ingredientibus’ he showed how we can legitimate our talk of
growth by characterising substances as items whose conditions of individu-
ation demand less than the identity of their integral parts. If, however, we
choose to characterise a substance simply as an integral whole, then we will
have to agree that as such it does not grow. The author of the Tractatus
seems to suppose that substances may be characterised in this way by means
of what he refers to as essential terms. Thus he remarks about growth.
There are certain forms which apply to a person only, such as growth
(crementum) and decrease. Whence if Socrates grows and Brownie de-
creases in size, and there is a union only of essence between Socrates
and Brownie, one must concede ‘Socrates grows’ and deny ‘Brownie
grows’.29
Furthermore, the Tractatus goes on to note that ‘aliquid’ is a term
predicated of essence alone, which is as it should be since it is a neuter
28. “The Game of Obligation,” p. 121. “Sed potest queri quare adiectivum
sumptum in neutro genere potius sit essentialis terminus quam adiectivum sumptum
in mascculino vel feminino genere. Ad hoc est respondendum quod masculinum et
femininum inponuntur a forma rei et propter hoc dicunt <ur> termini formales, et
ita personales; neutrum genus non inponitur ab aliqua forma que sit in re, immo a
pura privatione. Et ita intelligitur res sine forma, et ita terminus essentialis.”
29. “The Game of Obligation,” p.121: “Notandum quod sunt quedam forme
que conveniunt persone tantum, sicut crementum et decrementum. Unde si Sortes
crescat et Brunellus decrescat et fiat union essentie tantum inter Sortem et Brunel-
lum, hec est concedenda: ‘Sor crescit’; hec autem neganda: ‘Brunellus crescit’.”
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pronoun. This being so, providing that the Tractatus will allow that the
propositions are well-formed, we can prove the thesis that nothing grows by
appealing directly to philosophical grammar: Since ‘to grow’ is a term
predicated of persons alone, it cannot be predicated of the indefinite
neuter pronoun ‘aliquid.’ But then ‘aliquid crescit’ is necessarily false and so
‘nihil crescit’ must be true.
The thesis that nothing grows is thus connected for the Nominales with
the claim about pronouns as part of theory of relations of persons and
essences. It seems from the reports that have survived that this theory was
applied by the Nominales to the question of the nature of the hypostatic
union and it is to that which I now turn.
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR AND THE THEORY
OF THE INCARNATION
Pope Alexander III condemned the Habitus Theory of the Incarnation
because it did not allow sufficient reality to the humanity of Christ. Both of
the other two theories, the Assumptus Theory and the Subsistence Theory
offered accounts which had the Word united with a real man. Insisting,
however, that  the  human  component in the Incarnation  be  genuinely
human immediately generated another problem: Why does the combina-
tion of body and soul in Christ not produce, just as it does in Socrates, a
distinct human person? The Habitus Theory had to be rejected because
according to it ‘Christus secundum hominem non est aliquid,’ but if in virtue of
his human nature Christ was aliquid, doesn’t it follow, as it does for Socrates,
that he was aliquis and aliquis distinct from the second person of the Trinity.
Our collection of testimonia contains three sets of references to the
views of the Nominales on the Incarnation. They are found in works by Peter
the Chanter, Alexander Neckham, and Godfrey of Poitiers dating from the
end of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth century. From them
it is clear that the Nominales upheld a version of the Subsistence Theory and
that they solved the ‘est aliquid’ puzzle by appealing to their general account
of the application of pronouns.
According to the Subsistence Theory, in the Incarnation a human body
and soul were united to the second person of the Trinity and to one
another. Peter the Chanter tells that in addressing the question of how
many distinct items were involved in these unions—that is, how many
natures and how many persons—some people appealed to a distinction that
the Nominales made for rational substances in general:
some say that since the assumed man is the person, that is the incarnate
Word, the Word and the assumed man are in no way to be counted
separately. Nevertheless one can say something about the man in such
a way that one is not saying something about the Word. The situation
12 CHRISTOPHER J. MARTIN
here is just as it is in the secular sciences according to the Nominales . . .
For they distinguish between essence and person. Socrates and the
substance which he is cannot be counted separately, but nevertheless I
am able to talk about the essence without speaking about Socrates.30
In the passage I quoted earlier, Alexander Neckham records that the
Nominales treated the divine and created persons in the same way and so it is
reasonable to suppose that Peter is here reporting their views on divine as
well as secular matters. As a grammatical and logical corollary of the distinc-
tion between essence and person insisted on by Abaelard and the Nominales
they could, thus, avoid the threat of multiplicity posed by the conditional ‘si
Christus est homo qui non est Pater, Christus est aliquid quod non est Pater’ by simply
rejecting, as Godfrey notes, the inference from ‘homo’ to ‘aliquid.’31
Directly contradicting the Nominales, Alexander Neckam, one of the
Parvipontani, and so a Realis, maintains that while it is true that a divine per-
son is a quis but not a quid, where they claim that ‘esse Petrum est esse quem et non
esse quid,’ it is true rather that ‘esse Petrum non est esse quem sed est esse quid.’ Alex-
ander formulates his discussion in terms of the supposition and the use of
pronouns but warns us that the distinction between personal supposition for
a person and essential supposition for an essence must be distinguished as
theological from the logical use of the expression ‘personal supposition’ in
contrast to ‘simple supposition.’ Could we have here a terminological distinc-
tion which may help us to trace the Nominales further?32
The latest record of the Nominales to make a connection between their
views on pronouns and the thesis that nothing grows also introduces us to
30. Iwakuma and Ebbesen, text 33a. “Nota quod quidam eorum dicunt quod
cum homo ille assumptus sit persona, Verbum scilicet incarnatum, nullo modo
connumerabilia sunt Verbum et ille homo assumptus. Potest tamen fieri sermo de
homine illo ita quod non de Verbo, sicut in secularibus litteris secundum Nominales
qui dicunt quod substantia que est Socrates desinit esse, non tamen Socrates desinit
esse. Distingunt enim inter essentiam et personam. Nulla connumeratio est inter
Socratem et substantiam que ipse est, tamen possum loqui de illa essentia, licet non
loquar de Socrate.”
31. The point, I take it, is to avoid arguments like that used by William of
Auxerre: “‘Christ is God and man,’ William says, ‘and to be God is to be something
[quid]; likewise, to be man is to be something [quid]. Therefore Christ is something
and something. Therefore he is one and another. Therefore Christ is two’,” (De
Incarnatione 3, 1), quoted in W. Principe, William of Auxerre’s Theology of the Hypostatic
Union, (Toronto: P.I.M.S. 1963), p. 93.
32. Speculum Speculationum, Lib. II, p. 125: “Licet autem in sacra Scriptura
utamur hac diuisione suppositionum, ‘Alia est personalis, alia essentialis’, in logicis
tamen non habet locum hec diuisio secundum multorum assertionem. Notum est
autem etiam uulgo que sit personalis suppositio, secundum quod distinguitur a
simplici suppositione. Personalis enim suppositio dicitur, cum de re maneriei agitur.
Simplex est suppositio, cum pro manerie redditur uera locutio. Vnde et hoc relati-
uum ‘qui’ uel ‘que’ quandoque dicitur facere personalem relationem, quandoque
simplicem;  personalem ut  cum dicitur ‘Mulier que fuit Eua causa fuit nostre
dampnationis’, simplicem ut cum dicitur ‘Mulier que dampnauit, saluauit’.”
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a very striking impossible positio. Godfrey of Poitiers asks us to consider the
impossible hypothesis that the body and soul of Christ continue to exist and
to be united with one another after the union of each of them with the
second person of the Trinity has been dissolved.33 The question that then
has to be answered is whether the man who exists after the dissolution is the
same man who existed before it. Godfrey denies this, claiming, indeed, that
the composite of body and soul that exists after the union never existed
before. In the texts in which he reports their views Godfrey, like Peter of
Capua on occasion, adopts the rather unfortunate device of speaking at one
time with the voice of a Realis and at another with that of a Nominalis, and
so all that is clear in this particular case is that his own view disagrees with
that of the Nominales. Their response, he tells us, is to concede that the
composite that exists after the dissolution of the hypostatic union existed
before the dissolution but to deny that the man who exists after the disso-
lution existed before.34 Again they base their reply on the principle that it
is ‘one thing to demonstrate a person, quite another to demonstrate an
essence,’ thus making just the distinction that enables them to concede ‘this
man grew’ while denying ‘this substance grew.’
CONCLUSION
The Nominales’ thesis that nothing grows is thus explained as a consequence
of a distinction that they insist on between substance and essence, the same
33. We are not told why the hypothesis is impossible but the Definition of
Chalcedon requires us to acknowledge “unum eundemque Christum Filium
Dominum unigenitum in duabus naturis inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, in-
separabiliter, agnoscendum, nusquam sublata differentia naturarum propter uni-
tionem” (Enchiridion Symbolorum *302, ed. Denzinger, [Herder, Freiburg, 1965]).
34. I have to emend the text here. Iwakuma and Ebbesen, text 48d has:
“Nominalis, qui dicit quod aliud est demonstrare personam et aliud essentiam,
posset ad hanc impossibilem positionem de facili respondere. Potest enim conced-
ere istas ‘hoc compositum fuit’ demonstrato coniuncto ex corpore et anima; et
generaliter concederet sumptis terminis essentialibus et negaret sumptis personali-
bus, sicuti concedit ‘iste homo heri fuit’, non tamen concedit ‘haec substantia heri fuit’;
similiter ‘iste homo crevit’, non tamen ‘haec substantia crevit’. Et sicut hanc distin-
guerem multiplicem ‘haec substantia animata sensibilis crevit’ ita et hanc ‘haec
substantia individua rationalis naturae fuit’, quia haec dictio ‘haec’ potest adiungi
huic termino ‘substantia’ tantum, et sic demonstratur essentia et alii termini veni-
unt appositive et est sensus ‘haec substantia quae est individua rationalis naturae
fuit’, et sic vera, et non sequitur ‘ergo iste homo’ ab essentiali ad personalem; vel
hoc signum ‘haec’ potest demonstrate totalem definitionem ‘substantia etc’, et cum
definitio sit personalis sicut et definitum, non demonstratur ibi nisi persona, et ideo
falsa. Similiter haec vera ‘hoc compositum fuit’, non tamen ‘iste homo fuit’.”
I have to read the Nominales as conceding the claim about substance and
denying the one about man but I am not shy of doing this since (1) that is what they
should do; and (2) that is what the explanation that follows has them doing.
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distinction that manifests itself in their claims about the difference between
the neuter and the masculine and feminine forms of adjectives and pro-
nouns. I have argued elsewhere that the Nominales may well have been
responsible for the invention of impossible positio. Whether or not they
were, the case of the positio just discussed35 suggests that even without
looking for the use of Abaelardian connexive logic we may still hope to trace
the Nominales and their influence in a characteristic strategy for dealing with
such hypotheses. There is thus some hope that even if we find no more
testimonies to them we may still be able to track the traces of the followers
of Peter Abaelard in regions into which he himself never ventured.
35. The positio was being used in the 1170s. See the “Quaestio Anonymi De
Homine Assumpto,” ed. Lauge Nielsen, CIMAGL 66 (1996): 228. It is very well
developed in William of Auxerre’s Summa Aurea, III:1.3.7, ed. Ribaillier, iii:1, pp.
29–34.
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